It was a divided nation that the Japanese invaded in December 1941. The Japanese occupation divided the country even further, preparing the ground for the interracial bloodbath that occurred after their surrender in 1945. In this article, I will not discuss the war itself but focus only on the developments that had an impact on interracial relationships in Malaya, which in turn had an effect on the struggle for independence.
Treatment of the different races
The Japanese military had different treatments for the different races in Malaysia, with the most severe reserved for the Chinese, whom the Japanese have fought in China for four years before the invasion of South East Asia. Within a month after occupying Singapore, the Japanese authorities planned and implemented the Sook Ching massacre, screening the Chinese male population for alleged anti-Japanese activists and other potential troublemakers. The death toll ranged from 6,000 as acknowledged by the Japanese government to the academic consensus of 25-50,000. The killings then spread to the Malayan mainland, but due to the more dispersed Chinese population there making screening more difficult, the killings were more indiscriminate. A similar number were killed in Malaya. After the initial massacre, the Chinese continued to be more harshly treated due to the continuing war in China.
The Indians and the Malays fared a little better, with the Japanese hoping to entice the Indians to join the anti-British Indian National Army and also to use them to inspire uprisings against the British in India. Very much like the British, the Japanese also co-opted the Malays into running the country and much like the British before them, the Japanese also sent civil servants to Japanese language classes, which also provided lessons in reverence for all things Japanese. By and large, the Malays were rather impervious to Japanese claims of racial superiority but the Japanese message of Asians overthrowing European colonialism did appeal to them.
Even if treated better compared to the Chinese, the Malays and Indians were by no means well treated. Thousands of Tamils from Malaya were sent to work in Thailand & Burma and of those who survived the deplorable working conditions, many were killed. Though Malays were co-opted as a part of the ruling class, the Japanese made clear who was the true ruler of Malaya and the mistreatment was such that when the British Force 136 parachuted into the Malayan jungle to organise anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, they had to turn away Malay recruits, such was the Malay feelings against the Japanese.
In any case, thousands of Indians and Malays were recruited to work on the railroad in Thailand – yes, that infamous Bridge over River Kwai - and many died from the harsh working conditions, building up much resentment in common against Japanese chauvinism towards non-Japanese people. With this common cause in a common suffering, Indian writers reported of Indians in the estates tracking and rejoicing at the progress of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (‘MPAJA’).
Impact on inter-racial relationships
The four northern states that used to be under Siam were ceded to Thailand as a reward for its support of the Japanese (the Japanese invaded Malaya via Pattani province in southern Thailand). As these four states were heavily Malay majority, the remaining states in Malaysia became Chinese majority, especially when Singapore was included. This led to rumours among the population that the rump Malaya would be annexed to China as its 19th province. You can imagine Malay misgivings, and looking across to the keen Chinese anticipation of the idea, only engendered suspicions across racial divide.
Where the British pro-Malay policy succeeded in keeping the Malay ruling elite on side, the Japanese equivalent policy was crippled by the denigration of subject peoples that was such a feature of Japanese worldview at that time. And while British policy kept the Chinese neutral towards the Malays, Japanese mistreatment of Chinese caused them to look to Malays with resentment and suspicion.
The MPAJA
The Chinese took to the jungle in droves, joining the communist-led MPAJA which got a lot more organised under the leadership of the young Chin Peng and with supplies of British arms parachuted in to the Malayan jungle. The MPAJA itself was 95% Chinese and the Communist Party of Malaya (‘CPM’) had only one non-Chinese member on its central committee, an Indian. It only made belated attempts to recruit Malay leaders late in the war. It was also at the end of the war when they also re-established relationships with Malay left-wing leaders disillusioned with Japanese reluctance to grant the independence promised for their assistance before and during the invasion.
Bearing the brunt of the fighting against the Japanese, many Chinese fighters saw Malay civil administrators and police force as collaborators. MPAJA attacks on the Malay police only deepened the interracial divide with an active antipathy towards each other and much of the Malay popular culture of Malay policemen fighting Chinese communists could have dated from this time.
Interregnum
On 15 August 1945, Japanese forces throughout the Pacific and Asia heard the bitter order from their Emperor to lay down their arms. Most complied and the few who refused, committed suicide. However all over Asia, there was no one to take their surrender. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers appointed to command to occupy Japan was the highly narcissistic General Douglas MacArthur. Not wanting to be upstaged, he directed that there was to be no surrender ceremony anywhere until he himself has taken the Japanese surrender, planned for a grand ceremony on a US battleship at Tokyo Bay on 31 August. Consequently and crucially, there was to be no landing of Allied troops in Japanese occupied territories either. Weather eventually delayed this first surrender ceremony to 2 September.
It was only then that surrenders were signed all over Asia. A Japanese naval officer signed the first surrender in South East Asia on a British warship in Penang later that same day, 2 September, while subsequent surrenders were signed in Labuan, Sarawak and Singapore on 10, 11 and 12 September respectively. This however did not mean that the British forces returned to Malaysia immediately after the surrender ceremony. While a small Royal Marines detachment landed in Penang the same day of that first surrender and further detachments arrived in Singapore and Morib on 5 and 9 September respectively but it took until the end of the month before the British reasserted effective control over its colonies in South East Asia.
Communist reprisals
There was therefore a period of some three weeks between the time of the Japanese surrender and the arrival of British troops. During those three weeks, known as the Interregnum, there was no central authority in the country. When the Japanese retreated to their barracks, the MPAJA emerged from the jungle to take over guard duties at key strategic installations and took over any unopposed Japanese weapons depots. They also quickly settled accounts with those they deemed collaborators. And being the only authority during the power vacuum, CPM cells set up peoples tribunal to identify collaborators and mete out summary judgements and punishments. There were also a number of attacks on civil servants, especially Malay policemen, the first on 15 August itself, the day of the Japanese surrender – an attack on a police station in Kuantan, which was repulsed. These attacks were conducted at the initiative of local commanders and were uncoordinated. As a result, there were incidents of indiscriminate killings of Malay communities in some villages, spreading fear and trepidation.
After a short period of waiting for the British-trained Malay sultans to act, local leaders emerged from the community to organise Malay resistance to CPM attacks. Many were local civil servants, especially the District Officers. This included the District Officer in Batu Pahat, by the name of Onn Jaafar, who did very well to negotiate the peace in his district. In some communities, local religious leaders were the one who organised the resistance. In some cases, counter-reprisals were conducted on Chinese communities. It was, therefore, a period of several weeks of lawlessness and fear for all communities.
Lost opportunity
The CPM did not use much radio communication to send directives to field regiments due to the fear that they would be intercepted by the Japanese. They relied on couriers, who often take months to arrive, and even then needed to be interpreted for local conditions. At the same time, Lai Tek, the CPM secretary-general who was actually a British and Japanese triple agent, was really waiting to link up with his British superiors for instructions. Due to his hesitant leadership and the autonomous nature of CPM field command, the CPM central committee had little influence over the course of events in this one month. As a result, the CPM lost their best chance to declare a people’s republic and present the returning British with a fait accompli, just like the Indonesians did with the returning Dutch. Fighting the British three years later, when the British were more entrenched militarily and politically, handed the advantage to the British and Malayan authorities.
The Communist also did not do their public image any good. Their show of force in towns and villages throughout the country were seen as an attempt to intimidate the people. The Chinese, while recognising their protection and their anti-Japanese struggles during the war, remain suspicious of Communist intentions on their businesses and their maturity to rule – many of the more radical CPM leaders were youths, with Chin Peng himself just 21 at war’s end. Reprisals against alleged collaborators also did not win them much friends in the Malay community and contributed to the perception of Chinese as the enemy of the Malay people. It was remnants of a communal memory such as this that continue to haunt interracial relations even today.
The British Military Administration
The British had planned an invasion of the Malayan peninsula with a landing of troops at the Port Klang, then known as Port Swettenham, or at Port Dickson on 12 September, followed by a gradual takeover of the rest of the peninsula, giving them time to slowly assert British control over the country. At the same time, Australian troops would continue to administer British colonies on Borneo island that they occupied after their invasion in March.
The rapid surrender of the Japanese on 15 August, however, caught the British unprepared for an instant takeover of the country. While the first British troops occupied Penang on 3 September, it took a further three weeks to eventually occupy the entire country. The key initial objectives were accepting surrenders of Japanese garrisons, raising the British flag in the towns – and lowering communist ones - and occupying key strategic installation, often relieving communist sentries there. By now, Japanese surrenders are large ceremonial affairs documented for posterity and were often accompanied by a parade of British military forces. The big one was in Singapore where communist fighters marched through the streets with British Army soldiers and Chin Peng himself was decorated with the Order of the British Empire by the British commander Mountbatten - that OBE was of course withdrawn later on. A final ceremony in Kuala Lumpur reenacted the Japanese surrender the following month in February 1946.
Disarmament
The first task British troops had was disarming Japanese soldiers and then interning them for repatriation to Japan. That was the easy part. By large measures, Japanese soldiers were disciplined in their surrender but some 200-400 Japanese soldiers joined the Communists in the jungle to oppose the British. A few were executed on the orders of Lai Teck, the CPM Secretary-General but most who remained continued the fight in an apparent belief in the Japanese promise to liberate Malaya from their colonial masters. There were still two Japanese soldiers among the Communist fighters at the cessation of the armed struggle in 1989. These two septuagenarians were repatriated back to Japan from Bangkok, the last Japanese soldiers of WW2.
Next, was implementing the agreement with the MPAJA to disarm and hand back the weapons supplied to them by the British. Slow in starting, the MPAJA eventually handed in their weapons. However, it soon became clear as the weapons were handed in, that the best and newest weapons were not among them: the communists have stashed away the best weapons in anticipation of a conflict with British authorities, and that was before accounting for any weapons seized from the Japanese.
Civilian administration
While the BMA was first set up on 15 August, the day of the Japanese surrender, it was only finally installed in Kuala Lumpur on 12 September. Despite having a number of civilian advisers, there were inadequate resources to govern a country and impose civil order. One must remember that this was a military organisation trained to fight wars against large enemy formations, not a police force trained to disarm criminals among innocent civilians. Less than a quarter of the BMA officers had government experience and only a quarter had prior Malayan experience. As a result, the BMA was probably not the best equipped authority to run the country but they were the only authority that Malaya had at that time.
While the presence of British soldiers dampened down the communist displays of force, feelings of insecurity persisted at the sight of former Communist fighters walking around freely, with the air of people in ascendancy if not in power. The CPM had carefully husbanded their forces during the war and at the conclusion of hostilities, they had their more loyal formations largely intact and armed with the best weapons. With these, the CPM military wing were ready to do battle with the British.
The BMA administrative structure took over the powers of the sultans and authority of the Malay district officers were also suspended. The British remained suspicious of the Malay elite and their collaboration with the Japanese during the war, being reminded of the KMM’s active support of the Japanese invasion and also the fact that none of the Malay royalty evacuated Malaya with the British colonial officers. On the other hand, wartime comradeship made the British much friendlier with the Chinese than before, contributing to the Malay sense of insecurity.
Crime, which became a way of life under Japanese occupation, remain persistent with 600 murders reported between the end of the war and the start of the emergency, with the true number believed to be much higher. Kidnappings were common and piracy, which the British eradicated in 1880s, returned to the west coast. In all these, the BMA was seen as helpless to maintain basic law and order.
The economy
The biggest BMA failure was in the area of the economy. During the war, average income fell to less than half the pre-war levels, with much of the food supplies reduced as a result of Allied naval blockades. It must be remembered that Malayans were dependent on imports for half of their rice supplies. This was compounded by gross mismanagement of the economy by the Japanese, who printed money as a way out of economic problems. They even had mobile printing press to print money, often without any documentation or records, and this led to hyperinflation and the Japanese-issued currency, known as banana money because of the picture of a banana tree on it, became practically worthless. With deprivation and hunger, a thriving black market emerged and corruption became endemic in a country where pre-war rules and mores on corruption used to be strictly enforced.
The BMA quickly replaced the banana money with the Malayan dollar, but due to inadequate supplies of the Malayan dollar, the country was left with no practical currency for a period of time. With demonetisation of the banana money, any savings carefully accumulated during the war instantly became worth only the paper it was printed on. Inflation and the black market, thus, persisted until it became a running joke that BMA stood for Black Market Authority. It also became clear very early on that the British had no money to reconstruct the country and coupled with currency controls arising from British shortage of US dollars, strangled commerce in Malaya. While much of the post-war conditions as well as the currency control policy were not the fault of the BMA, the BMA became associated with economic deprivation in the minds of people.
Consequently, there was a great loss of British prestige due to this failure to run the country. The initial euphoria of the British return quickly give way to the harsh realities of life under the BMA. Coupled with memories of British military losses to the Japanese, Malayan respect for the British evaporated to the point that in 1946, the CPM could hold a rally in Singapore to commemorate the anniversary of the 1942 fall of Singapore to the Japanese.
The one positive from the BMA was that they rationalised the Malayan car number plates throughout Malaya into a single system.
Political development
In October 1945, former leaders of the KMM formed the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (‘PKMM’) or the Malay Nationalist Party. Its inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur was attended by a representative of the local Sultan of Selangor, who funded it while CPM leaders gave speeches on Malayan multiracialism at its first congress in December. It was a belated CPM departure from its Sino-centric stance of the past. CPM attendance at that PKMM congress also marked the first cross-racial cooperation in the struggle for independence.
So, it was in this environment that the Malayan Union proposals were put forward: the British on the verge of losing respect from the people they ruled; the Malays feeling rather insecure at their minority status and reeling from distrust by the British and its right to rule challenged by Communist arms; the Chinese hesitant about their support for the CPM, who were at the height of their confidence as the only armed opposition to the British; and both communities beginning to realise that they need to work together to gain independence from the British.
In the next article, we get introduced to A very ordinary Malayan woman, but brave enough to be Malaya's cross-ethnic war hero.
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